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COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL LAW-CONVENTION ON OFFENSES AND
CERTAIN OTHER ACTS COMMITTED ON BOARD
AIRCRAFT-THE TOKYO CONVENTION
The first known hijacking1 of an airplane in the United States was to
Cuba, in May of 1961.2 The event seemed to prophesy the destina-
tion of most of the future United States hijackings, for, since the incep-
tion, in that year, the overwhelming majority of hijackings in the United
States have been to Cuba.
Overall, from May of 1961, to August 9 of 1969, there have been 83
actual or attempted hijackings to Cuba, including all types of aircraft of
every nation. Of these, 73 have been successful, and 54 involved air-
craft of United States' registry. 4  The problem also seems to be worsen-
ing. During the period beginning February, 1968, to September, 1969,
the number of hijackings jumped sixteenfold; there were more successful
acts of this nature during this period than there had been in the previ-
ous twenty years. 5
A point of interest is that success seems to generate renewed activity.
A successful hijacking or series of hijackings instigates others to do the
1. The prevalence of airplane hijacking has given rise to terms and phrases
which are uniquely associated with it. For example, the process itself has been
referred to as "skyjacking," Denaro, In-Flight Crimes, the Tokyo Convention, and
Federal Judicial Jurisdiction, 35 J. AiR L. & CoM. 171, 172 n.7 (1969); and
"highjacking," Stephen, "Going South"-Air Piracy and Unlawful Interference with
Air Commerce, 4 INT'L LAWYER 433, 435 (1970). Also, pilots radio the phrase,
"Going South" to indicate that a hijacking is taking place, id. at 433. For pur-
poses of this paper, I shall continue to refer to the process as "hijacking."
2. Stephen, supra note 1, at 433.
3. Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L LAW
695, 697 (1969); Stephen, supra note 1, at 434.
4. Loy, Some International Approaches to Dealing with Hijacking of Aircraft,
4 INI'L LAWYER 444, 445 (1970).
5. Evans, supra note 3, at 697; Stephen, supra note 1, at 433. Evans gives
the following breakdown of statistics, supra note 3, at 698 n.14: Successful aircraft
hijackings, January 1, 1948--Sept. 8, 1969:
1948: 7 1958: 2 1964: 1
1949: 7 1959: 4 1966: 1
1950: 3 1960: 3 1967: 5
1952: 1 1961: 6 1968: 30
1953: 1 1962: 2 1969: 46
1956: 1 1963: 1
States of registration of successfully hijacked aircraft:
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same. Thus, there are waves of hijackings, with the numbers of actual
and attempted hijackings increasing with each wave. The "waves" which
have been noted have been during the years 1961-1962; 1964-1965; and
1968-1969. On an average, there have been 4 per month.6
But if the number of hijackings is alarming, an exposition of the type
of person7 that is likely to commit such an act should give renewed cause
for alarm. The temperament and make-up of the potential hijacker is
especially serious because of the number of lives his action commands.
A large proportion of hijackers are mentally imbalanced and/or in
trouble with the law." The type of mental imbalance can be best de-
scribed as varying degrees of schizophrenia and/or paranoia, usually
brought about by personal or professional failure, or dissatisfaction with
Argentina: ------------------------------------------ 1 M exico: ------------- ------------- - - - 5
Baham as: .......................................... 1 N ationalist China: --------------- ...- ------------ 4
Brazil: ----------------------.......---------------------- 1 Peru: ------------------------------------------------------ 2
Bulgaria: ------------- ---------.-.-.---........ 1 Phillippines: ----------.......--- ---------- --... 2
Colombia:- - 13 Poland: -------------- ...............--------------------- 1
Cuba: ------------------------------------------------ 7 Portugal: ................-------------------- 2
Czechoslovakia: ................................ 7 Rom ania: ---- --------------------.----------- 2
Ecuador: ---------.-.---------------.- .......--  - - - - 2 Spain: --------------------------............ 1
Egypt: ----------------------- - - --....... 2 U.S S.R.: ------------------------------------------------ I
Ethiopia: ----------------------------------------------- I United States: ------------ -  - 51
Greece: ---------------------------------------- 4 Venezuela: ------------------------------------------ 5
Hungary: ------- ------ -.-......... ..... 2 Yugoslavia: ------------------------.------------ 2
Israel: --------------------- ... ---- -- 1
United States air carriers hijacked, February 17, 1968-Sept. 9, 1969:
Continental: -------------------------------- 1 Northwest Orient: --------------------------- 1
Delta: ----------------------------------------------- 3 Pan American: ..................------------------ 2
Eastern: ---------------------------------------__.. 14 Southeast: ------ - -...............-------------- 1
N ational: ----------------------------- --------------..10 Trans W orld: ................................ .. 2
Northeast:----------- 2 United: -------------- ........-----------.-------------- 2
"From July 1 through Sept. 8, 1969, there were 12 hijackings, making a total of
46 in 8 months: United States, 6; Colombia, 2; and 1 each of aircraft registered in
Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, and Mexico. Five United States aircraft were hijacked to
Cuba; one was hijacked to Syria by two members of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, acting for political reasons." See Appendices B & C.
6. Evans, supra note 3, at 705; supra note 4, at 445.
7. Although a hijacker usually acts alone, there have been several instances of
up to four hijackers securing the control of a single aircraft; and in at least six
cases, members of his family accompanied the hijacker. Evans, supra note 3, at 700.
8. Stephen, supra note I, at 435. Evans notes that fourteen out of forty-nine
identified or attempted hijackers had criminal records. Four were wanted by
police on charges from passing bad checks to the attempted murder of a policeman.
Three had been military deserters, while two more had been involved in difficulties
with domestic relations. Evans, supra note 3, at 700. In the longest known
hijacking, on November 1, 1969, from California to Rome, the former U.S.
Marine who conducted the hijacking claimed during trial in an Italian court that
he could not get a fair trial in the United States on charges of burglary from a
United States military installation. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 12, 1970, at 3, col. 4
(final ed.).
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the American way of life.9 If the hijacked plane is one of United States'
registry, the hijacker will most probably be a United States national,
but persons of Cuban nationality run a close second. 10  They are
not infrequently armed."
A degree of consolation can be gained from the fact that, in 1969, 5 out
of 6 attempted hijackings by mentally disturbed persons failed, 12 and
that, as a rule, the Castro regime has not received hijackers with much
warmth.' 8 But a new problem can be foreseen: that of the political
extremist. The urban guerilla, perhaps best typified by the Weatherman
faction of the Students for a Democratic Society in their heyday, sees the
airplane as a perfect instrument for sabotage. The airplane is " 'just a
big, old, fat, pregnant, vulnerable dove out there.' ",'4 Presumably, also,
Cuba represents a bona fide sanctuary to the extemist, who would not
exclude hijacking from his viable alternatives.
Superimposed on the fact of hijacking is the principle that the United
States recognizes no right of extradition except by treaty.15 The United
States has ceased diplomatic relations with Cuba, and thus extradition
is not, strictly speaking, possible.' 6  The return of hijacked United
States aircraft and passengers from Cuba has thus far been successfully
9. Evans, supra note 3, at 700; supra note 4, at 445; LIFE, April 18, 1969, at
26; TIME, Jan. 31, 1969, at 19.
10. Evans, supra note 3, at 700; Stephen, supra note 1, at 434.
11. Evans, supra note 3, at 699 n.16. Evans notes, id., that, according to a
statement from the Department of Justice, 37 hijackers have used guns, 4 have
used knives, and 6 have used both weapons. They are not beyond using hand
grenades, dynamite sticks, nitroglycerine, and machine guns.
12. Supra note 4, at 445.
13. See, e.g., LIFE, April 18, 1969, at 27.. It is evident that, in almost all cir-
cumstances, the Castro regime has not treated hijackers kindly. There is frequent
evidence of imprisonment, and at least one instance of mistreatment. Id.
14. The statement is attributed to Carl F. Maisch, director of the FAA's Of-
fice of Air Transportation Security. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1970, at 76.
15. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
16. Evans, supra note 3, at 706. Professor Evans has a dissenter to this stance.
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni takes the view that cessation of diplomatic relations
with a country does not in itself abrogate the terms of any treaty. Thus, extradi-
tion from Cuba to the United States is still possible. See Bassiouni, Political
Offenses, infra note 51, at 219. This would present certain other problems,
however, for Cuba has expressed a willingness to extradite for hijacking, but only
with the caveat that it be mutual. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1970, at 11, col.
7. The United States has obviously granted asylum to a great number of Cu-
ban nationals who have fled the Castro regime, many of whom have arrived
in America by a variety of means, including hijacking. Interview with M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Professor, DePaul University College of Law, in Chicago, April 20, 1971.
See Evans, The Political Refugee in United States' Law and Practice, 3 INT'L.
LAWYER 205 (1969). Other writers hold that the "severing of diplomatic ties"
with Cuba has suspended the applicable treaty's operation. Hirsch & Fuller, Air-
craft Piracy and Extradition, 16 N.Y.L. FORUM 392, 402 (1970).
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concluded by notification of either the Czech embassy (which maintains
diplomatic contact with Cuba) in Washington, or the Swiss Govern-
ment, which maintains an embassy in Havana. The return of the air-
craft and passengers is arranged with appropriate reimbursement. 17
Although the return of the aircraft and passengers has been arranged
in this way, the hijacker remains in Cuba. The United States does have
the Extradition Treaty of 1904 with Cuba,"' which provides for extra-
dition of an offender for the offenses of larceny of movable property of
a value of more than $50.00 and kidnaping.'9 By the terms of the
treaty, the requisition of such offender is to be made by the diplomatic
agents of the U.S. and Cuba20 (presumably the Swiss Government
could be classed as such); but the Department of State has taken the
view, as early as 1961, "that the Federal offenses of kidnaping a person or
transporting a stolen aircraft in interstate or foreign commerce could not
be comprehended within the terms of the treaty offenses because the focus
in each of the Federal offenses is upon the element of illegal transportation
rather than upon the offenses per se.''21  Thus, arguably, the Treaty
does not in terms include the offense of illegal transportation.
Hence, it was successfully to combat this problem of aircraft hijacking
that the representatives of 61 governments 22 attended the International
Conference on Air Law convened at Tokyo, Japan, in 1963. The Confer-
ence was sponsored by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, which has its
headquarters in Montreal. The result of the Conference was the drafting
17. Evans, supra note 3, at 699.
18. March 2, 1905, 33 Stat. 2265 (1904), T.S. No. 440 (1904).
19. Extradition Treaty with Cuba, March 2, 1905, art. II (14), (15), 33 Stat.
2265 (1904), T.S. No. 440 (1904). Evans, supra note 3, at 706 nn. 62, 63.
20. Extradition Treaty with Cuba, March 2, 1905, art. III, 33 Stat. 2265 (1904),
T.S. No. 440 (1904); Evans, supra note 3, at 706 n. 62. The treaty states:
"Requisitions for the surrender of fugitives from justice shall be made by the diplo-
matic agents of the contracting parties. ...."
21. Evans, supra note 3, at 706-07, citing Deputy Legal Adviser (Meeker) to
Assistant Attorney General (Miller), July 18, 1961; 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 790.
22. Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelo-
russian S.S.R., Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazza-
ville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France,
Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungarian People's Republic, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Phillippines, Polish People's Republic,
Portugal, Republic of China, Republic of Haiti, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Mali, Republic of the Upper Volta, Rumanian People's Republic, Senegal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukranian S.S.R., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
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and enactment of the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, or, more simply the Tokyo Convention.
23
The Tokyo Convention became effective on December 4, 1969, after
ratification by the United States. 24
The purpose of this comment is to provide a general explanation of the
Tokyo Convention, and to describe the mechanics by which the contracting
nation-states are attempting to solve the problem of "Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft."
PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION RECOGNIZED IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Fundamental to any understanding of the Tokyo Convention, which,
because of the speed of aircraft, necessarily includes crimes which, more
often than not, are international in nature, are the bases by which na-
tion-states assert jurisdiction under international law. In order success-
fully to prosecute a crime, the nation-state's first step must be to acquire
jurisdiction.
THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY
Simply stated, the mere fact of one's nationality enables the nation
to which that nationality applies to assert jurisdiction. 25  Further, be-
cause aircraft registered in a particular state may be said to have the
Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
23. See Appendix A. October 1, 1969, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
For purposes of simplicity, the "Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft" shall be hereinafter cited as the "Tokyo Convention,"
"Tokyo," or "Convention."
24. By the terms of the Convention itself, it was to come into force 90 days
after ratification by twelve of the signatory states. Art. 21, October 1, 1969
[1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A. The United States
was the twelfth, the other eleven being Denmark, Italy, Mexico, Niger, Norway,
Phillippines, Portugal, Republic of China, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Upper
Volta. Although the ratification by the United States was deposited with Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization on September 5, 1969, the agreement entered into
force on December 4, 1969. Only those nation-states actually ratifying the
Convention agree to be bound by it.
It might be noted at this point that a distinction is sometimes drawn between
a convention and a treaty, the former being said to look forward to universal ac-
ceptance, whereas the latter rely on the principle of reciprocity. Other writers
make no distinction between the two. Compare Gutierrez, Should the Tokyo'
Convention of 1963 Be Ratified? 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 13 (1965), with Boyle &
Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, 30 J. Am. L. & COM. 305, 306 (-).
25. Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture Un-
der the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REv. 509, 511 (1967). As I mentioned, supra,
jurisdiction is the necessary element. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
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"nationality" of that state, this principle also supports the view that events
committed on board an aircraft should be submitted to the state of registry
of that aircraft.2 6
A concomitant of this theory is the active-passive personality doctrine.
This principle would give a nation-state jurisdiction for a crime committed,
anywhere in the world, by or against one of its nationals. This theory is
rejected by certain jurisdictions, including the Anglo-American. 27
THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY
The basis of this principle is the right of the sovereign to control ev-
erything that occurs within (or above) its domain. If something occurs
which has an effect on the state itself, this principle likewise gives the
nation-state jurisdiction. With this principle it is possible to reason under
maritime law that any vessel flying the flag of a particular nation is the
juridical extension of that nation. Thus, any act committed against the
vessel has an effect on the territory of that state, again giving it juris-
diction.28
A theory which is similar to this is the principle of protection. This,
however, is not universally accepted, for this principle would enable a
state to assert jurisdiction for a mere threat to its sovereignty.2 9
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY
Some crimes are so heinous as to be universally accepted as threatening
to our present civilization. An example is piracy. Thus, the nature of
the crime itself gives all nations the power to assert jurisdiction.30
THE PRINCIPLE OF FIRST LANDING
This is asserted as a practical alternative to crimes committed aboard
aircraft. Under this view, the first nation in which the aircraft lands is
able to assert jurisdiction.8 ' The practicality of such a view, however,
disappears in the case of a forced landing upon the high seas, which would
necessitate the application of one of the other theories.
PROCESSES: THE LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER 330 (1969); George, Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609 (1966).
26. Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 3, 7.
27. Supra note 25, at 512.
28. See supra note 25, at 511. See also text accompanying infra notes 33, 37,
38.
29. Gutierrez, supra note 24 at 4; supra note 25, at 512.
30. Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 4; supra note 25, at 511-12
31. Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 4; supra note 25, at 514.
490 [Vol. XX
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THE LAW OF THE FLAG
The law of the flag has been described as being the same as the
principle of nationality. Thus, the nation-state in which an aircraft is
registered is able to assert jurisdiction over acts occurring on board.32
It may be debated whether or not the consideration of a vessel flying
the flag of a particular nation as a "juridical extension" 33 of that nation
gives rise to a true territoriality-nationality dichotomy, when an aircraft is
flying over the high seas, if an aircraft is considered as a "vessel" within
applicable maritime law.3 4  The conflict can arise only when the aircraft
flying the flag (i.e. is a national) of one state has a crime committed on
board the aircraft while it is flying over the territory of another nation;
assuming, of course, that the former nation subscribes to the law of the
flag theory, and the latter to the principle of territoriality.
THE PRINCIPLE OF MULTIPLE COMPETENCES
This theory admits the coexistence of several types of the above
principles. This is the theory of the Tokyo Convention.3"
AN OVERVIEW OF TOKYO
A distinction has been drawn between the common law countries, which
favor a theory of territoriality, and the civil law countries, which favor
the nationality principle.36 It might be noted, however, that the "juridical
extension" theory, while applicable to the maritime law of the United
States, was refused application to United States' aircraft in the case of
32. See, e.g., supra note 25, at 513, citing Fauchille, Le Domain Aerien et le
Regime Juridique des Aerostats, 8 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIc (1902), as the first proponent of this theory.
33. See text accompanying supra note 28.
34. See text accompanying infra notes 37, 38.
35. Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 4; supra note 25, at 514-15. Assume that the
act of hijacking is piracy. On a flight of a BOAC jet from Paris to Chicago, an
Italian national attempts a hijacking. To get the pilot to accede to his wishes, he
murders a German stewardess as the plane is over Indiana. The plot is foiled,
however, and the plane requests a forced landing in Canada, which is effectuated.
Because it happened on a BOAC aircraft, England can assert jurisdiction under
the law of the flag. Both Italy and Germany could assert jurisdiction under the
active-passive personality principle. Because murder occurred in United States'
airspace, the United States can assert jurisdiction under the territoriality principle.
Canada can assert jurisdiction as the place of first landing. The crime of piracy
allows any and all states to assert jurisdiction under the principle of universality.
The Tokyo Convention recognizes the potentiality of assertion of all the jurisdic-
tions delineated above.
36. Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 4-5.
1971]
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United States v. Cordova, 7 on the ground that the aircraft was not a "ves-
sel," and that thus a crime committed over the high seas was not com-
mitted upon the high seas. This case gave rise to the enactment of para-
graph 5 of section 7 of Title 18 of the United States Code (1964) which
defines the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States" to include flag aircraft of the United States flying over the high
seas.
Although one work has suggested that the above legislation resulted
in the extension of the law of the flag to American aircraft,88 this is not
truly correct, for such legislation is merely a "juridical extension" of
the territory of the United States, coextensive with maritime law desig-
nations. As such, the "law of the flag," if such, is extended only to United
States aircraft flying over the high seas.89 Therefore, the United States,
until its ratification of the Tokyo Convention, remained a nation which
asserted the principle of territoriality as a basis for its criminal jurisdiction.
There are two other concepts necessary to explore before an examina-
tion of the text of the Convention proper. It has been noted that the
Tokyo Convention allows for the coexistence of several recognized bases
for the assertion of jurisdiction. Although this is recognized, the Conven-
tion delimits no system of priorities of jurisdiction among the several na-
tions which may have a basis for asserting it.40 The contracting states
are free to decide which among them shall assert jurisdiction, and the
manner in which it will be asserted; a provision proposed by the United
States.4I Although there are provisions in the Convention for arbitration
of any dispute and final determination by the International Court of
Justice, 42 such provisions probably will, in practice, result in needless
37. 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
38. Note, Aircraft Hijacking: Criminal and Civil Aspects, 22 U. FLA. L. REV.
72, 86 (1969).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1964) states that the 'special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States" includes "Any aircraft belonging in whole or in
part ...to any [United States] corporation ...while such aircraft is in flight
over the high seas, or over any other waters ...out of the jurisdiction of any par-
ticular State." This does not, of course, extend maritime jurisdiction to airspace
immediately subjacent to "any particular" nation-state.
40. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 329.
41. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 353. One writer, however, has found an
implicit system of priorities, based upon the princiiple of negative inclusion (i.e.
that certain provisions of the Convention refer only to those matters not specifically
excluded). This is, as the writer states, an especially "unique" theory. Denaro,
supra note 1, at 188-92.
42. Tokyo Convention art. 24, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S.
No. 6768. See Appendix A.
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hindrance and frustration of the purposes of the Convention, especially in
disputes concerning the major powers.
Another problem is that nowhere in the Convention is there a provision
for the principle ne bis in idem, del" or double jeopardy. Should one
accept the notion of no priorites for jurisdiction, an argument that ne bis
in idem should be adopted readily follows, to prevent a subsequent exer-
cise of jurisdiction for the same crime after a trial with resulting punish-
ment or finding of innocence. 43  Although the adoption of a provision of
this type was also discussed, it too, was finally dropped. 44
THE SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
Article 145 gives the basic formula for the vis vitae of the Convention.
The basic prerequisite is that an aircraft registered in a contracting state
be in flight, or on the surface of the high seas or any area outside the
territory of any state. An aircraft is considered to be in flight from the
moment when power is applied for take-off, until the moment the landing
run ends.
The second prerequisite is that an offense or act must be done by a
person on board the aircraft. Presumably the offense must be one against
penal law, and the act must be one which may or does jeopardize the
safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property on board the aircraft.
Also, the use of the word "person" would appear to include not only the
passengers, but also the crew, and even the aircraft commander.
Two effects can immediately be seen. One is that the language ex-
cludes saboteurs who merely plant a bomb on the plane, without taking
the flight. 46 Another is that the Convention purportedly applies even to
purely domestic flights. 47 In those nations that recognize the territoriality
43. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 313, citing Danilovics and Szondy, Les
Infractions h la loi penale commises h bord des aeronefs, 14 DRorr APR.1EN 402
(1914).
44. Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 17. The principle ne bis in idem is notoriously
lacking, however, in almost all documents which look to international agreement. It
seems that the nation-states focus more upon the potential potency of the asser-
tion of prosecutorial powers than upon actual punishment of the offender.
45. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
46. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 331. Throughout the Convention, it is
made clear that, while the Convention ostensibly deals with offenses committed on
board aircraft, the person who commits the offense must also be on board.
47. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 332; Denaro, supra note 1, at 175. For
example, on a flight of a United plane from Kennedy airport in New York to
O'Hare Field in Chicago, the flight, from start to finish, is accomplished wholly
within United States airspace. However, the Convention applies, for the aircraft
is "in flight" as defined within the Tokyo Convention.
1971]
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principle, however, an aircraft flying over the territory of the state in
which it is registered would be subject to the laws of that nation in any
event.4
8
The Convention applies not only when the airplane is in flight, but also
applies in the situation of a forced landing on the high seas. Military,
customs, and police aircraft, even if registered in a contracting state, are
not within the scope of the Convention.
Article 2 4 exempts certain offenses against penal law from the appli-
cation of the Convention. Thus, if the offense committed on board is
of a political nature or based upon racial or religious discrimination, the
Convention is ordinarily inapplicable. By ratification, however, a state
does not give up its right to prosecute a crime of this nature, for it has not
given up any jurisdiction it has a right to assert. 50 Likewise, if the offense
is of a political nature, or based upon religious or racial discrimination, and
some form of action is necessary for the safety of the aircraft or of persons
or property on board, this Article authorizes such action. The section
presents obvious problems of interpretation; many persons would have
difficulty interpreting the meaning of the phrase "of a political nature." 51
JURISDICTION UNDER THE TOKYO CONVENTION
Paragraph 1 of Article 352 is considered the most important Article
48. Tokyo Convention art. 3(3), October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941,
T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A. This is especially true of the United States,
which, even before the Convention recognized the principle of territoriality, and
thus would assert jurisdiction for acts occurring on board a plane flying within
its airspace.
49. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6758; see Appendix A.
50. See text accompanying ihra note 73.
51. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 333. Particular issue may be taken with
the phrase, "offenses against penal laws of a political nature," (emphasis added).
As a rule, the only offense which can truly be classified as a "political" crime is
the crime of treason, for this crime looks to the overthrowing of a particular nation-
state. Other crimes are, by their very nature, apolitical. For instance, the crime of
murder, whether it be committed against serf, prince, or president, has no politics,
unless politicity can be gained from the person against whom the crime is com-
mitted. The taking of a life, the destruction of a vessel, the assault upon an am-
bassador are crimes, purely and simply, per the proscription of statute. Any at-
tempt to politicize them must fail. If I may paraphrase dear Gertrude, "A murder
is a murder is a murder." See Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the
Political Offenses Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an
Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 217 (1969); and Bassiouni, International
Extradition in American Practice and World Public Power, 36 TENN. L. REV. 1,
16-19 (1968).
52. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
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in the entire Convention, 53 for it is an extension of the law of the flag to
each registering state.54  The state of registration of the aircraft clearly
has jurisdiction over acts occurring aboard its aircraft over the high seas
by means of this section. But the section exacts from each contracting
state even more: it represents an independent grant of jurisdiction to
each sovereign which flies a registered aircraft through the airspace of an-
other sovereign, by that other sovereign. Thus, it is clear that at least the
state of registration of the aircraft can assert its jurisdiction over offenses
and acts committed on board the airplane anywhere in the world, once the
Tokyo Convention applies.
This, then, is the greatest strength of the Convention, for it can assure
eventual prosecution by at least one sovereign. This jurisdiction may there-
fore be asserted by a nation recognizing the nationality principle even
when an offense or act is committed aboard its registered aircraft in flight
in the airspace of a nation that, until the Convention, recognized solely
the territoriality principle.
The United States and others strongly opposed the view that an obliga-
tion should be placed upon a contracting state to exercise the jurisdiction
granted by paragraph 1 of this Article.55 The instruction to the draft-
ing committee reflected this fact. Thus, paragraph 2 has been inter-
preted as placing an obligation on contracting states merely to define the
precise offenses over which jurisdiction is able to be asserted: the decision
whether or not to assert the jurisdiction was left to the state of registry.56
Pursuant to this obligation, Congress has made criminal certain acts
committed aboard aircraft in flight in air commerce. These include as-
sault,57  maiming,58  larceny,59  receiving stolen goods, 60  murder,61
53. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 333.
54. Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 2.
55. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 335.
56. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 335-36, citing Documentation for Diplo-
matic Conference, Tokyo, Japan, ICAO Doc. SR/9. See supra note 25, at 515.
It might be noted that not many states have an offense defined for aircraft hijacking.
For instance, a 1969 hijacking from California to Rome was tried by an Italian court
on the basis of kidnaping, assault, and illegal weapons charges. The United States
made no formal extradition request. CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, supra note 8.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1964). This crime, as well as the ones described in the
text accompanying infra notes 58-70, were made crimes when committed within the
"special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
58. 18 U.S.C. § 114 (1964).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 662 (1964).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1964).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
manslaughter,6 2 attempt to commit murder or manslaughter,6" rape,"'
carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen, 65 robbery, 66 in-
terference with members of the flight crew or flight attendants, 7 carrying
concealed weapons aboard aircraft,68 conveying false information concern-
ing attempts or alleged attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated
in the statute, 69 and aircraft piracy.70 It might be noted that there is
no statute of limitations for the offense of aircraft piracy,71 and, by
fleeing, the offender tolls any applicable statute of limitations. 72
Thus, by ratifying the Tokyo Convention and enacting appropriate
legislation, the United States can assert jurisdiction over the above of-
fenses committed on its registered aircraft occurring within the sovereign
airspace of other ratifying states. A refusal so to do, however, may
serve as precedent for other nations since the ultimate purpose of the
Article, that is, that at least one nation punish the offender would be
frustrated.
Paragraph 3 of Article 3 establishes the principle of multiple compe-
tences. Under this paragraph, the principles of jurisdiction enunci-
ated previously 73 may be asserted over in-flight crimes, if the crimes as
defined are concomitant with the national law of the state which is striving
to assert it.
Article 474 gives a limited right to a contracting state to "interfere" with
an aircraft in flight to a contracting state though not the state of registry
of the aircraft, in certain limited situations. 75
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1964).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (1964).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1964).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2032 (1964).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964).
67. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(j) (1964).
68. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(l) (1964).
69. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(m) (1964).
70. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1964).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1964): "An indictment for any offense punishable by
death may be found at any time without limitation except for offenses barred by
the provisions of law existing on August 4, 1939."
72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3282 (5-year statute of limitations for any non-capital of-
fense), 3290 ("No statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from
justice.") (1964).
73. See text accompanying supra notes 25-35.
74. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
75. Presumably interference means forcing it to land. Supra note 25, at 518.
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For purposes of argument, it will be assumed that this right is given
only to a subjacent (i.e. that state in whose airspace the airplane is, under
the principle of territoriality) contracting state. 76
Presumably, a violation of the subjacent state's laws can have an ef-
fect on its territory. 77 Article 4(b) is a reiteration of the active-passive
personality principle, and gives a right of interference with an aircraft in
flight. A breach of the security of a nation is but an extension of the
principle of territoriality, and the same right is given to the contracting
state in this instance.
Article 4(d) gives some credence to the argument that this Article ap-
plies only to subjacent contracting states. Rules and regulations per-
taining to flight or maneuver of aircraft normally apply to flight in a
state's airspace. Since no qualification is given in this or any other
section of this Article, it can be argued that this section is applicable as
are the other sections: to a limited right of interference in the subjacent
state's airspace.
The wording of Article 4 is ambiguous. Especially Article 4(b) which
appears to allow the contracting state to "interfere" with the aircraft any-
where in the world. The tenor, however, would more practically be to
grant a right to a state only while the aircraft is within its territory. The
Article likewise imposes no obligation upon the contracting state to exer-
cise its right to interfere. All in all, the state can "interfere" with the
aircraft anytime it wants to, so long as it doesn't do it with the purpose of
"exercis[ing] its criminal jurisdiction."78
POWERS OF THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER
This section of the treaty79 is unique in the history of air law. By its
application, certain duties of the contracting state are brought into effect.
Initially, it applies only in the case of convention-defined international
flight. This type of flight occurs in two instances: (1) Where the last
point of take-off or the next point of intended"° landing is in a state other
76. Compare Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 336-37, who take it for
granted that it is a subjacent state, with Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 9 n.63, who
has difficulty with this interpretation.
77. Gutierrez, supra note 24, at 10.
78. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
79. Tokyo Convention, ch. 3, art. 5, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941,
T.I.A.S. No. 6768; See Appendix A.
80. The term is nowhere defined in the Convention. A flight from Paris to
Miami has as its "intended" point of landing Miami International Airport. In the
1971]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
than that of registration; or (2) when the aircraft flies in the airspace of a
state other than that of registration subsequent to the offense or act com-
mitted or about to be committed with the person still on board. There-
fore, the flight of a United States registered aircraft from Los Angeles
to Oahu, although an international flight (for it traverses international
waters), is not convention-defined international flight, for neither of
the two instances have occurred. In purely domestic flight, then, the
recent introduction of military sky marshals sl to ensure safety of air
carriers can cause no conflicts with the aircraft commander's authority
under the Convention, for he has none in this case.
Assuming that convention-defined international flight is present, such
flight is deemed to be in progress from the moment when all the aircraft's
external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when
any such door is opened for disembarkation. Thus, when the commis-
sion or threatened commission of an offense or act occurs while the
plane is on the runway awaiting take-off, the aircraft is in flight, and
certain powers devolve upon the aircraft commander, even though the air-
craft is not "in flight" for purposes of Article 1.s12 There is continued
application even in the case of a forced landing and until the competent
authorities of any (?)83 state take over responsibility for the aircraft and
persons or property on board.
The language of Article 684 gives only a power to the aircraft com-
mander; it does not require him to exercise it. The power can arise only
when convention-defined international flight is in progress, as per Article
5 above. Assuming that such flight is in progress, if the commander has
"reasonable grounds" to believe that a person on board the aircraft has
committed or is about to commit an offense against penal law, or an act
which may or does jeopardize the safety of the aircraft, of persons or prop-
erty therein, or good order and discipline on board, he may take "reason-
able measures," including restraint, necessary to preserve the safety, good
order and discipline of the aircraft.
These "reasonable measures" may bring into effect corresponding pow-
case of a hijacking in flight to Cuba, however, can it be said that now the "in-
tended" point of landing is Jos6 Mirtiz Airport in Havana?
81. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1970, at 77.
82. For purposes of simplicity, I shall refer to the flight of Chapter I as
"Article I flight," and the flight which actuates the provisions of Chapter III as
"convention-defined international flight."
83. See text accompanying article 9, infra.
84. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
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ers and duties of the various states: he may "deliver" such person to
"competent" authorities, or the commander may "disembark" him. The
two terms must always be distinguished, for each carries with it corres-
ponding duties, some of which are co-extensive in each case. Presum-
ably, "competent" authorities are those authorities of contracting states
only.85
Once the aircraft commander desires to exercise his power of restraint,
he may require crew members, request passengers, or authorize any of
them to do the actual restraining. By the use of this language, the aircraft
commander, if he wishes to take any other type of "reasonable measures,"
must do so himself, for he does not have the foregoing authority over
crew and passenges beyond that indicated.
Passengers and crew members are similarly given a qualified power in
this Article. They may take "preventive" measures alone, without au-
thorization from the aircraft commander, to preserve the safety of the air-
craft, or of persons or propety therein if one condition is met: they must
have reasonable grounds to believe that such measures are immediately
necessary to carry into effect the above objects. It might be noted that
this section comes into play when any "person on board" commits a
prohibited act. Thus, this power may be exercised when the commander
himself does or threatens to do a prohibited act. The powers of passengers
are certainly less than those of the aircraft commander, and, true to form,
no duty devolves upon them by this Article.
Article 786 gives the time limitation for any restraint imposed upon a
person pursuant to the power given the commander under the preceding
Article. Restraint ordinarily is not to extend beyond the point of first
landing. It can, however, continue beyond that point in four instances:
(1) Where the aircraft commander desires to disembark the passenger,
but the land state is not a contracting state and refuses disembarkation;8 7
or (2) the aircraft makes a forced landing and the aircraft commander
is unable to deliver that person to competent authorities; 8 or (3) the
person agrees to onward carriage under restraint (apparently because he
doesn't want to disembark in the state in which the aircraft has landed);
85. See text accompanying discussion of infra Article 9.
86. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
87. It might be noted that a contracting state has no power to refuse disem-
barkation. See text accompanying infra Article 12.
88. Again, the word "competent" is used in conjunction with the aircraft com-
mander's power to "deliver." Presumably, this then means he cannot deliver him
to the authorities of other than a contracting state. See text accompanying infra
Article 9.
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or (4) the aircraft commander has imposed restraint in order to effectuate
his other power of delivery, and the aircraft has landed in a non-contract-
ing state.
Paragraph 2 of Article 7 imposes another duty upon the aircraft com-
mander if he decides to exercise his power of restraint. As soon as pos-
sible, he has the duty to notify the authorities of the state in which he in-
tends to land that he has a person on board under restraint, and of the
reasons for the restraint.
A built-in conflict is present in the terms of Article 7. Nothing is said
of what happens if the aircraft lands in a non-contracting state which is
able to assert jurisdiction over the offense and wants disembarkation,
but the aircraft commander has imposed restraint in order to effectuate
his power of delivery. Probably the power to assert jurisdiction would
govern the power of the aircraft commander to deliver.
This section89 gives the mechanics for the effectuation of the aircraft
commander's power to disembark a passenger. It is to be noted that he
has the power to disembark a person in any state in which the aircraft
lands, once the power is exercisable. If it is necessary to protect the safety
of the aircraft or of persons or property therein, or to maintain good order
and discipline on board, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the person has committed or is about to commit an act which may or does
jeopardize the safety or good order and discipline, the power arises, al-
though the commander has no duty to exercise it. Once he disembarks
such person, though, he has a duty to report the fact of and the reasons
for the disembarkation.
It is well to note that he may disembark a passenger without prior re-
straint. 90 If no restraint is used, he may disembark without notifying
the landing state, and thus it would have no opportunity to refuse disem-
barkation. 91 Likewise, if the person has committed a penal offense
which does not jeopardize safety or good order, the Convention applies,
but the commander has no power of disembarkation.9 2 The power to
disembark applies when a landing is made in any state.
Article 993 describes the procedure of the aircraft commander's power
89. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
90. That is, with only the "reasonable measures" taken, which are contem-
plated in Article 6, supra.
91. The duty to notify in Article 7 is conditioned upon prior restraint, while the
duty in article 8 to report can be reasonably interpreted as a post hoc report.
92. Article 1(a) is not included by reference in Article 8.
93. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
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to deliver. The word "deliver," as used in the Convention, is a word
d'art, and it is only in this Article that one can derive the true meaning of
the word as it is used in the other Articles. The commander may deliver
to the competent authorities of any contracting state. By using this lan-
guage, the Convention apparently means that the only "competent" au-
thorities are those of a contracting state, when the commander seeks to
exercise his power of delivery.
The power to deliver arises only when the commander has reasonable
grounds to believe that a person has already committed on board the
aircraft an offense which is, in his opinion, a serious offense of the penal
law of the state of registration of the aircraft. The commander need not
know the law of the state of registration-the offense need be serious only
in his opinion; restraint and delivery can follow. He need have only
reasonable grounds to believe that the offense has been committed.
Before going any farther, the power to disembark pursuant to Article 8
can be exercised only upon landing within a state; likewise the power to
deliver pursuant to Article 9 can be exercised only when the aircraft lands
within a contracting state. In the case of a forced landing pursuant to
Article 4, no problem is presented, for the landing will be within a con-
tracting state, enabling the commander to deliver or disembark. In the
case of a forced landing by a non-contracting state, the same built-in
conflict arises as discussed in Article 7.94 But where the aircraft makes a
forced landing at sea, the commander's powers to disembark or deliver
cease: the airplane has not landed within a state. Also, his power to
take reasonable measures, including restraint, ceases unless an offense
or act was committed on board.95 His power does not extend to acts com-
mitted aboard life rafts. The Convention, however, still applies, for the
aircraft is in "any other area outside the territory of any state,"'9 6 even
though sunk.
Once the commander intends to deliver a person, this section also
places two duties on him. He must, as soon as practicable, notify the au-
thorities of the contracting state of his intention, and of the reasons there-
for.
The second duty is found in paragraph 3, and this paragraph gives a
94. See supra p. 32.
95. Tokyo Convention Art. 5(2), October 1, 1969 [19691 20 U.S.T. 2941,
T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A. Also note the use of the words, "competent
authorities of a state. . ." (emphasis added).
96. Tokyo Convention art. 1(2), October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941,
T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A. This is typical of the anomalies that can arise
under the Convention.
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modicum of protection to the suspected offender. Although the aircraft
commander must furnish the authorities to whom the person is delivered
evidence and information concerning the alleged offense, only what evi-
dence and information lawfully in his possession under the law of the state
of registration is to be tendered. Thus, for United States registered air-
craft, constitutional guarantees apply.
Article 1097 gives immunity, for actions taken pursuant to the Conven-
tion, from any proceeding by a person against whom actions were taken
in accordance with the terms of the Convention. The immunity is granted
to the aircraft commander, the crew, any passenger, the owner or oper-
ator of the aircraft, and the person on whose behalf the flight was per-
formed.
This Article grants immunity with respect to every type of action
brought by the suspected offender. It does not, however, prevent an ac-
tion by another passenger who was unjustly and incidentally harmed by
action taken against such suspected offender.
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT
Article 1198 imposes a duty upon contracting states to take all appro-
priate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander
or to preserve his contol over the aircraft, when a person on board has
unlawfully committed or threatened to commit an act of interference,
seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control over the aircraft in Article 1
flight, or when such act is about to be committed. Presumably, whether
or not the act is unlawful is to be determined by the law of the state of
registration, passed pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 2.19 "Appropriate
measures" mean all that is feasible and lawful to do. Thus a contracting
state 1000 miles from the scene of the hijacking is obliged to do nothing,
for this would not be feasible; to pursue an aircraft through the airspace
of another state would not be lawful. 100 It remains, therefore, that a
contracting state has the duty to force down an unlawfully seized aircraft
within its own airspace, if the next paragraph in the Article is to be given
meaning.
Paragraph 2 of Article 11 states that the contracting state in which the
97. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
98. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
99. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 345. See text accompanying supra
notes 55-72.
100. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 345.
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airplane lands has the duty to permit the passengers and crew to continue
their journey as soon as is practicable, returning the aircraft and its cargo
to those lawfully entitled to possession. The duties imposed by Article 11
are some of the few actually imposed by the Tokyo Convention.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF STATES
There is an unqualified duty placed upon contracting states by Article
12.101 They must permit the aircraft commander of a plane registered
in another contracting state to disembark the person sought to be disem-
barked pursuant to the exercise of the commander's power of Article 8.
Article 13102 likewise places a duty upon contracting states to accept
delivery of a person pursuant to the exercise of the power granted to the
aircraft commander by Article 9. Once the contracting state has taken
delivery, it must take custody (if it is satisfied that the circumstances so
warrant) or other measures to ensure the presence of that person. The
same duty of custody or other measures to ensure his presence applies
to those suspected of violations of Article 11, and whatever measures are
taken are to be instigated by the law of the state in which the aircraft
lands. Such measures may be continued for such time as is reasonably
necessary to institute criminal or extradition proceedings. Once custody
is taken, the contracting state has an obligation to assist the person in im-
mediate communication with the nearest appropriate representative of the
state of which he is a national.
When a person is delivered, or when an aircraft lands in a contracting
state following the commission of an unlawful seizure of aircraft, such
contracting state has the duty to make an immediate preliminary inquiry
into the facts. Once the state has taken a person into custody, it must
immediately notify the state of registration of the airplane and the state
of which the detained person is a national. If it deems it advisable, it
may notify any other interested state; but it must promptly report its find-
ings to all the notified states, and also indicate whether or not it intends
to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 14103 states that: (1) When a person has been disembarked
or delivered by the aircraft commander, or when he has disembarked
after committing an unlawful seizure of aircraft; and (2) when such per-
son cannot or does not desire to continue his journey; and (3) the state of
101. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [19691 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
102. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
103. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
504 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
landing refuses to admit him; and (4) he is not a permanent resident or
national of that state; then that state may return him to: (1) The territory
of the state of which he is a permanent resident or national; or (2) the
territory of the state in which he began his journey by air. Because the
Convention requires the presence of certain persons in contracting states,
certain safeguards were placed in paragraph 2. Thus, that paragraph
provides that no act of the contracting state pursuant to Articles 13 and
14 shall in any way affect the state's laws with respect to immigration, de-
portation, or extradition.
In Article 15104 it is provided that any person who has been disem-
barked or been delivered by the aircraft commander, or who has disem-
barked after committing an unlawful seizure of aircraft, shall be at liberty
to proceed to any destination of his choice as soon as is practicable, pro-
vided his presence is not required by the law of the state of landing for
purposes of extradition or criminal proceedings. Paragraph 2 places a
duty upon contracting states to accord any person in their territory pur-
suant to Articles 8, 9, or 11 the same treatment accorded to their own
nationals in like circumstances.
OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY
Because most extradition treaties refer to crimes committed within the
territory of a state, Article 16105 states that an offense committed aboard
a registered aircraft of a contracting state shall be considered, for pur-
poses of extradition, as if committed not only in the place it occurred, but
also in the territory of the registering state. 10 6 The Article goes on to
say the Convention creates no duty to grant extradition.
Article 17107 is self-explanatory. Article 18 states that where an
aircraft is registered in more than one state, those states of registration
shall designate which one among them shall be considered as the state of
registration for purposes of the Convention, and shall communicate this
decision to the International Civil Aviation Organization.10 8
Articles 19109 and 22110 limit the possible parties to the Convention
104. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
105. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
106. Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 24, at 351.
107. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768; see Appendix A.
108. Tokyo Convention, October 1, 1969 T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
109. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
110. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
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only to members of the United Nations or the Specialized Agencies,
thereby effectively blackballing Red China. Article 21111 states that
the Convention shall come into force for each ratifying state 90 days




Looking toward United States' interests, and to the realities of hijacking,
it must be remembered that the Tokyo Convention binds only those
states which ratify it. To date, Cuba has not. However, as in the case of
the usual hijacking, both the United States and Cuba would be able to
assert jurisdiction over the hijacker even under the Convention. 1 3 Per-
haps the present system of returning merely the passengers and aircraft"
14
has a lesser potentiality than the Convention for a face-to-face confronta-
tion between the great powers, although it lessens the deterrent effect of
summary prosecution of the hijackers, than the Convention.
It has been previously noted that the Tokyo Convention delimits no
system of priorities to the exercise of jurisdiction, while it admits of many
potential exercises."1 5 There are three ways of viewing this from a
practical standpoint. First, the setting up of priorities would be the most
practical. Second, the more strict the rule is, the more likely it will be
broken. Third, knowing the adamancy of states with respect to their own
sovereignty, it is unlikely that they would submit to a possible exercise
of their jurisdiction only at the largess of a state having a higher priority:
thus, the Convention would never be ratified. But in truth the realities
of a system of no priorities are just as, if not more, dismal.
Practically speaking, is not the punishment of the hijacker the prime
movant of any agreement similar to the Tokyo Convention? If the focus
is on prosecution, it makes little difference who does it; if nations are to
protect hijacked planes and passengers, it makes little difference which
nation does it. However, real pragmatism would encompass an interna-
tional airline boycott of any nation that harbors hijackers, or detains hi-
jacked planes and passengers. This surely would be more effective than
111. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
112. Tokyo Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
113. The U.S. because it is the state of registry, Tokyo Convention art. 3(l),
October 1, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; and Cuba under any
principle of national law, Tokyo Convention art. 3(3), October 1, 1969 [1969] 20
U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Appendix A.
114. See text accompanying supra notes 1-21.
115. See text accompanying supra notes 40-42.
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leaving the nations involved to fight out the assertion of jurisdiction among
themselves. The International Civil Aviation Organization is currently
working on such a project.116
The main thrust of Tokyo can properly be said to be: Get the airplane
and passengers back on their route as soon as possible. Too little em-
phasis is placed upon punishment of the offender, with an aim toward the
eventful stopping of all aircraft hijacking. This weakness was appar-
ently noticed by the International Civil Aviation Organization, for it has
recently proposed a document whose title tells it all: Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. 117  This contains
some appropiate language:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall,
if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether
or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its com-
petent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. .... 118
Strong language, but it will become effective upon ratification by ten na-
tions.119 It took six years to make Tokyo effective.
Another problem in this whole area is emotion. For example, what if
the phrase, "Hijacking to Cuba," is substituted for "Asylum from Com-
munism?" The seizure of the Soviet Aeroflot on October 12, 1970,120 by
two passengers who diverted it to Turkey is surely an example of the latter.
In the absence of an extradition treaty, is prosecution by the landing state
"good," even under the Convention? 121 What about ne bis in idem?
In short, the Convention delimits many powers, but specifies too few
116. See supra note 81, at 78. At least one other writer has also advocated this
view. Buckley, The Hijackers, N.Y. Post, Sept. 15, 1970, at 36 col. 1; Buckley,
Terror in the Air, N.Y. Post, Mar. 12, 1970, at 32 col. 1.
117. I.C.A.O. Doc. No. 8920, December 16, 1970.
118. Id. at art. 7.
119. Id. at art. 13. And when, of course, only between those ten.
120. See supra note 81, at 42.
121. The question of asylum is equally important. Professor Bassiouni notes
that, as two nations become closer ideologically, asylum ceases to be a focal point
of their "non-relationship," and extradition for various offenses approaches the heart
of their "relationship." Interview with M. Cherif Bassiouni, Professor, DePaul
University College of Law, in Chicago, April 20, 1971. This ideological affinity is
manifested in some part by the treaties existing between the two countries. It is of
note, for example, that, in a list of all the treaties the United States has with each
country with which it has an extradition treaty, the United States has 9 treaties out
of a possible 59 with Cuba, and 26 out of a possible 59 with Canada. Bassiouni,
Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense Exception in Extradition
-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 217,
Appendix C (1969). Pragmatism appears to bear him out. We will extradite to
Canada, but not to Cuba.
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duties. The aircraft commander is required to take no action, even when
the ship is in danger; the duties of contracting (i.e. ratifying) states hinges
upon the prior exercise of the power of the aircraft commander; there is
no creation of a right of extradition; et cetera ad nauseam.
Perhaps the greatest drawback to the Tokyo Convention is the one
fault it couldn't avoid: It is, by nature, an international agreement. As
such, it relies on the continued goodwill of the nations bound by it for any
lasting effectiveness. At a time when it is difficult for the major powers
even to keep peace, reality would appear to reject any possibility of con-
tinued international agreement concerning incidents which are charged
with such a high potentiality for international conflicts. This may be
one reason why the member-states of ICAO saw fit to draft and sign the
1970 Hague Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, discussed in
Professor Sundberg's article in this issue.
Robert F. Klimek
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APPENDIX A
TOKYO CONVENTION
CONVENTION ON OFFENCES AND CERTAIN OTHER ACTS
COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT
THE STATES Parties to this Convention HAVE AGREED as follows:
CHAPTER I-ScOPE OF THE CONVENTION
ARTICLE 1
1. This Convention shall apply in respect of:
(a) offences against penal law;
(b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the
safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeo-
pardize good order and discipline on board.
2. Except as provided in Chapter II, this Convention shall apply in respect of
offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a
Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas
or of any other area outside the territory of any State.
3. For the purpose of this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight
from the moment when power is applied for the purpose of take-off until the
moment when the landing run ends.
4. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or po-
lice services.
ARTICLE 2
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 and except when the safety of
the aircraft or persons or property on board so requires, no provision of this
Convention shall be interpreted as authorizing or requiring any action in respect of




1. The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction
over offences and acts committed on board.
2. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish
its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences committed on board air-
craft registered in such State.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in ac-
cordance with national law.
ARTICLE 4
A Contracting State which is not the State of registration may not interfere with an
aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offence com-
mitted on board except in the following cases:
(a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State;
(b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent
resident of such State;
(c) the offence is against the security of such State;
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(d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations relating to the
flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State;
(e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any
obligation of such State under a multilateral international agreement.
CHAPTER 111-POWERS OF THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER
ARTICLE 5
1. The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to offences and acts committed
or about to be committed by a person on board an aircraft in flight in the airspace
of the State of registration or over the high seas or any other area outside the
territory of any State unless the last point of take-off or the next point of intended
landing is situated in a State other than that of registration, or the aircraft sub-
sequently flies in the airspace of a State other than that of registration with such
person still on board.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3, an aircraft shall
for the purposes of this Chapter, be considered to be in flight at any time from the
moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the
moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation. In the case of a forced
landing, the provisions of this Chapter shall continue to apply with respect to
offences and acts committed on board until competent authorities of a State take over
the responsibility for the aircraft and for the persons and property on board.
ARTICLE 6
1. The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a
person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an offence or
act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, impose upon such person reasonable
measures including restraint which are necessary:
(a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein; or
(b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or
(c) to enable him to deliver such person to competent authorities or to disem-
bark him in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
2. The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of other crew
members and may request or authorize, but not require, the assistance of passengers
to restrain any person whom he is entitled to restrain. Any crew member or
passenger may also take reasonable preventive measures without such authorization
when he has reasonable grounds to believe that such action is immediately necessary
to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein.
ARTICLE 7
1. Measures of restraint imposed upon a person in accordance with Article 6 shall
not be continued beyond any point at which the aircraft lands unless:
(a) such point is in the territory of a non-Contracting State and its authorities
refuse to permit disembarkation of that person or those measures have been im-
posed in accordance with Article 6, paragraph 1(c) in order to enable his delivery
to competent authorities;
(b) the aircraft makes a forced landing and the aircraft commander is
unable to deliver that person to competent authorities; or
(c) that person agrees to onward carriage under restraint.
2. The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable, and if possible before
landing in the territory of a State with a person on board who has been placed
under restraint in accordance with the provisions of Article 6, notify the authorities
of such State of the fact that a person on board is under restraint and of the reasons
for such restraint.
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ARTICLE 8
1. The aircraft commander may, in so far as it is necessary for the purpose of
subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragragh 1 of Article 6, disembark in the territory of
any State in which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to
believe has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft an act contem-
plated in Article 1, paragraph l(b).
2. The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of the State in which he
disembarks any person pursuant to this Article, the fact of, and the reasons for,
such disembarkation.
ARTICLE 9
I. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of any Con-
tracting State in the territory of which the aircraft lands any person who he has
reasonable grounds to believe has committed on board the aircraft an act which, in
his opinion, is a serious offence according to the penal law of the State of registra-
tion of the aircraft.
2. The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable and if possible before
landing in the territory of a Contracting State with a person on board whom the
aircraft commander intends to deliver in accordance with the preceding paragraph,
notify the authorities of such State of his intention to deliver such person and the
reasons therefor.
3. The aircraft commander shall furnish the authorities to whom any suspected
offender is delivered in accordance with the provisions of this Article with evidence
and information which, under the law of the State of registration of the aircraft, are
lawfully in his possession.
ARTICLE 10
For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither the aircraft com-
mander, any other member of the crew, any passenger, the owner or operator of
the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was performed shall be
held responsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment undergone by the
person against whom the actions were taken.
CHAPTER IV-UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT
ARTICLE 11
1. When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat thereof
an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft
in flight or when such an act is about to be committed. Contracting States shall
take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful com-
mander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
2. In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the Contracting State in
which the aircraft lands shall permit its passengers and crew to continue their
journey as soon as practicable, and shall return the aircraft and its cargo to the per-
sons lawfully entitled to possession.
CHAPTER V-POWERS AND DUTIES OF STATES
ARTICLE 12
Any Contracting State shall allow the commander of an aircraft registered in an-
other Contracting State to disembark any person pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 1.
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ARTICLE 13
1. Any Contracting State shall take delivery of any person whom the aircraft
commander delivers pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 1.
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State
shall take custody or other measures to ensure the presence of any person suspected
of an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1 and of any person of whom it has
taken delivery. The custody and other measures shall be as provided in the law of
that State but may only be continued for such time as is reasonably necessary to
enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to the previous paragraph shall be assisted in
communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State
of which he is a national.
4. Any Contracting State, to which a person is delivered pursuant to Article 9,
paragraph 1, or in whose territory an aircraft lands following the commission of an
Act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, shall immediately make a preliminary
enquiry into the facts.
5. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody, it
shall immediately notify the State of registration of the aircraft and the State of
nationality of the detained person and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested
State of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which war-
rant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in
paragraph 4 of this Article shall promptly report its findings to the said States and
shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 14
1. When any person has been disembarked in accordance with Article 8, para-
graph 1, or delivered in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, or has disembarked
after committing an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, and when such
person cannot or does not desire to continue his journey and the State of landing
refuses to admit him, that State may, if the person in question is not a national or
permanent resident of that State, return him to the territory of the State of which
he is a national or permanent resident or to the territory of the State in which he
began his journey by air.
2. Neither disembarkation, nor delivery, nor the taking of custody or other meas-
ures contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 2, nor return of the person concerned,
shall be considered as admission to the territory of the Contracting State concerned
for the purpose of its law relating to entry or admission of persons and nothing in
this Convention shall affect the law of a Contracting State relating to the expul-
sion of persons from its territory.
ARTICLE 15
1. Without prejudice to Article 14, any person who has been disembarked in ac-
cordance with Article 8, paragraph 1, or delivered in accordance with Article 9,
paragraph 1, or has disembarked after committing an act contemplated in Article 11,
paragraph 1, and who desires to continue his journey shall be at liberty as soon as
practicable to proceed to any destination of his choice unless his presence is re-
quired by the law of the State of landing for the purpose of extradition or criminal
proceedings.
2. Without prejudice to its law as to entry and admission to, and extradition and
expulsion from its territory, a Contracting State in whose territory a person has
been disembarked in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 1, or delivered in ac-
cordance with Article 9, paragraph 1 or has disembarked and is suspected of
having committed an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, shall accord to
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such person treatment which is no less favorable for his protection and security
than that accorded to nationals of such Contracting State in like circumstances.
CHAPTER VI--OTHER PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 16
1. Offenses committed on aircraft registered in a Contracting State shall be
treated, for the purpose of extradition, as if they had been committed not only in
the place in which they have occurred but also in the territory of the State of
registration of the aircraft.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceeding paragraph, nothing in
this Convention shall be deemed to create an obligation to grant extradition.
ARTICLE 17
In taking any measures for investigation or arrest or otherwise exercising jurisdiction
in connection with any offense committed on board an aircraft the Contracting
States shall pay due regard to the safety and other interest of air navigation and
shall so act as to avoid unnecessary delay of the aircraft, passengers, crew or cargo.
ARTICLE 18
If Contracting States establish joint air transport operating organizations or inter-
national operating agencies, which operate aircraft not registered in any one State
those States shall, according to the circumstances of the case, designate the State
among them which, for the purpose of this Convention, shall be considered as the
State of registration and shall give notice thereof to the International Civil Avia-




Until the date on which this Convention comes into force in accordance with the
provisions of Article 21, it shall remain open for signature on behalf of any State
which at that date is a Member of the United Nations or of any of the Specialized
Agencies.
ARTICLE 20
1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States in ac-
cordance with their constitutional procedures.
2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the International Civil
Aviation Organization.
ARTICLE 21
1. As soon as twelve of the signatory States have deposited their instruments of
ratification of this Convention, it shall come into force between them on the nine-
tieth day after the date of the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification.
It shall come into force for each State ratifying thereafter on the ninetieth day
after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
2. As soon as this Convention comes into force, it shall be registered with the




1. This Convention shall, after it has come into force, be open for accession by
any State Member of the United Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies.
2. The accession of a State shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of
accession with the International Civil Aviation Organization and shall take effect on
the ninetieth day after the date of such deposit.
ARTICLE 23
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by notification addressed
to the International Civil Organization.
2. Denunciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization of the notification of denunciation.
ARTICLE 24
1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpre-
tation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotia-
tion, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within
six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to
agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the
Statute of the Court.
2. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification, of this Convention or
accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the preceding
paragraph. The other Contracting States shall not be bound by the preceeding para-
graph with respect to any Contracting State having made such a reservation.
3. Any Contracting State having made a reservation in accordance with the pre-
ceeding paragraph may at any time withdraw this reservation by notification to the
International Civil Aviation Organization.
ARTICLE 25
Except as provided in Article 24 no reservation may be made to this convention.
ARTICLE 26
The International Civil Aviation Organization shall give notice to all States Mem-
bers of the United Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies:
(a) of any signature of this Convention and the date thereof;
(b) of the deposit of any instrument of ratification or accession and the date
thereof;
(c) of the date on which this Convention comes into force in accordance with
Article 21, paragraph 1;
(d) of the receipt of any notification of denunciation and the date thereof; and
(e) of the receipt of any declaration or notification made under Article 24 and
the date thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having been duly
authorized, have signed this Convention.
DONE at Tokyo on the fourteenth day of September One Thousand Nine Hun-
dred and Sixty-three in three authentic texts drawn up in the English, French, and
Spanish languages.
This Convention shall be deposited with the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion with which, in accordance with Article 19, it shall remain open for signature
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and the said Organization shall send certified copies thereof to all States Members
of the United Nations or of any Specialized Agency.





























































Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
United Arab Republic
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of May
13, 1969, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and
consent to the ratification of the Convention;
WHEREAS the Convention was duly ratified by the President of the United
States of America on June 30, 1969, in pursuance of the advice and consent of
the Senate;
WHEREAS it is provided in Article 21, paragraph 1, of the Convention that it
shall come into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit of the twelfth instrument
of ratification;
WHEREAS instruments of ratification were deposited with the International Civil
Aviation Organization as follows: Portugal on November 25, 1964; the Philippines
on November 26, 1965; the Republic of China on February 28, 1966; Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden on January 17, 1967; Italy on October 18, 1968; the United
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Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on November 29, 1968; Mexico on
March 18, 1969; Upper Volta on June 6, 1969; Niger on June 27, 1969; and the
United States of America on September 5, 1969;
AND WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 1, the
Convention will come into force between the aforementioned Sattes on December 4,
1969;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, Richard Nixon, President of the
United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public the Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft to the end that the
same and every article and clause thereof shall be observed and fulfilled with good
faith, on and after December 4, 1969, by the United States of America and by the
citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the juris-
diction thereof.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the city of Washington this first day of October in the year of our
Lord one thousand nine hundred sixty-nine and of the In-




/S/ Elliot L. Richardson
Acting Secretary of State
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Successful ....................................................................................... 0-- -- - - -- - - - - - 6
Unsuccessful ----------------------.-.--.---------.-.-.---------------------- ..  ............ .------ -- - - - - -- 13
T o ta l -......----------.. ......  ------------------........ ----------------------.... 7 3
Disposition
Convicted
By Aggrieved N ation ------------------- ... ---.-.-.--------------- .................  - -- - -  - - 11
By Receiving Nation ----------------------------.-.......................---------- .-----.. 2
Acquitted
By A ggrieved N ation ....................................................................--- - -- . . 3
By Receiving Nation -----------------------.-.----- ................. ....--- - - ---- ----. unknown
Granted Asylum, etc ------------- .. ....- ------ -------------------------------------------------------- 46
Pending -------------------.-.------.----------.-.-.-.-------- ... --- ..  .............. 1----- -  -- -  - - -  - - - 5
Hijackings 1/1/70-9/10/70
To Cuba ---- ----- -------.-.-.------ . -. -----.-.---.-.--.-.--.-.-------- ...... ...-- -  - -- ---- -- --- 24
U.S. Carriers - .- ----- - --- - -----------------------------.-.-------------.-.--.-.--------------.-.---........... . 9
Foreign Carriers---.-.------------.-.--.-.----------------....................-------------------------..- -- . 15
To Other D estinations -.-.----.-.-------------------------------.-.----- ........................- ---- ---- ---- .-- - 16
U.S. Carriers .---...........------ --------------------------------.-.---------.-.-................1------ - - - 2
F oreign C arriers -..------------ .... -------- .-.---- . . ...-.................----------- .... .. . 4
Total U.S. Carriers --- ..................----------------------------------------------------...... ...... 2---------- 21
Total Foreign Carriers -------......... ... .... 19
Total --- --------------.-.----.-----.-.---.--------------------------------------.--.-.--........4--  - ---- ---- -- - - 0
Total Hijacking of U.S. Carriers From 1961-9/10/70 ------------------------------------------ 94
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1970, at 1, col. 5; id. Sept. Sept. 7, 1970, at ,3col. 4.
Total Hijackings Through 9/10/70
Total ------.------------.-.--- .------------.-.-.-------.-.----------................---------.- - -- -  - - - ------------------- 251
Successful -------....----------------- ....-- ....---- ....  ........-....-------------....---------..- -- - -  - - -189
U nsuccessful -..------- .  ...  ...-.. ..--.-.-.--..-....... ... ... ........... 62
Successful to Cuba -............--- .-- -----.... .. 122
Success to Other Nations --------------------.-.-.-.-.----.-.....-... .......-------- 62
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1970, at 1, col. 5; id. Sept. 7, 1970, at 3, col. 4.
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APPENDIX C
DISPOSITION OF SELECTED FOREIGN HIJACKING CASES
DATE NAME AGGRIEVED DISPOSITION SOURCE
NATION
12/8/60 5 Men Cuba All were arrested
and returned to Cuba
11/27/61 5 men Venezuela Landed in Curacao;
all were extradited





















5/5/70 Panel Czechoslovakia To be tried in
Verner Austria
Hijackings
N.Y. Times, Nov. 28,
1961, at 21, col. 2
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29,
1963, at 1, col. 3
N.Y. Times, Sept. 29,
1966, at 1, col. 2
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9,
1969, at 79, col. 1
N.Y. Times, Sept. 17,
1969, at 10, col. 1
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1966, at 2, col. 1
N.Y. Times, March 31,
1969, at 1, col. 3
N.Y. Times, May 6,
1970, at 2, col. 1
